Startups and Solar Geoengineering

(Alt title: What's Wrong with Cooling Credits?)

Britta Clark
Harvard University
SGRP Postdoctoral Fellow



Background

- In 2023, Make Sunsets began selling 'cooling credits'—\$5 for 1g of SO₂ injected into the stratosphere (or so they claim).
- Patents and entrepreneurial interest in solar geoengineering are increasing (Ramos and Santos 2025).
- Widespread condemnation from the climate and geoengineering research communities.
 - Less agreement regarding the *nature* of the condemnation.



My Question

Why exactly should we be concerned about a market-based approach to solar geoengineering?

Focus: Stratospheric aerosol injection and the 'cooling credit' model

Goals

- 1. Differentiate between distinct arguments against the cooling credits model.
- 2. Begin to assess those arguments.



Cool the Planet, One Credit at a Time

Inspired by nature's cooling wonders, like volcanic eruptions, our balloons carry a precisely measured amounts of a naturally occurring substance into the stratosphere—think of it as sunscreen for the Earth!

Outline

- 1. The Business Case Objection
- 2. The 'Impact on Legitimate Research/Deployment' Objection
- 3. The 'Governance First' Objection
- 4. The 'Risk Redistribution' Objection
- 5. The 'Separate Responsibilities' Objection + Implications

What is objectionable about this scenario?

1. The Business Case Objection

Objection: There won't be a market for cooling credits because demand is unlikely.

- Cooling credits are arguably a public good (non rivalrous and non excludable); markets tend to under produce such goods.
- Hard to verify that your purchase had intended effect.

Reply 1: This objection also applies to markets in Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR). Yet these markets are growing.

Reply 2: Weak business case does not amount to a *normative* objection.

2. The Impacts on Legitimate Research or Deployment Objection

Objection: Selling cooling credits has a chilling effect on 'legitimate' research or deployment.

Reply 1: Circularity: The above argument assumes the conclusion it was trying to prove--that selling cooling credits is illegitimate.

Reply 2: Though hard to test the counterfactual, research funding and interest in solar geoengineering have grown despite startup activity (SRM 360 Funding Tracker)

3. The Governance First Objection

Objection: Private actors are bypassing public governance, acting without necessary legitimacy, consent, or public trust.

Reply: Does not rule out a future cooling credit system if embedded in legitimate governance structures.

- *Procedural*, not *substantive* critique.

"A couple of rogue tech bros taking action completely outside the scope of government authority or any public engagement are really embodying the nightmare of what folks think this could be."

Sikina Jinnah

4. The Risk Redistribution Objection

- Buying and selling stratospheric injection of SO₂ is not *intrinsically* problematic.
 - \neq Markets in organs, votes, people.
- Problematic when market involves avoided mitigation.
 - SG distribute risks and benefits differently than mitigation, even for the same amount of avoided warming.
- Is this **risk redistribution** a reason to reject cooling credit markets?
 - No, lots (all?) markets re-distribute risks and benefits.

5. Separate Responsibilities Objection

- Solar geoengineering and mitigation are *distinct obligations* owed to different groups.
 - **Solar geoengineering:** Benefits people in the relatively short term by quickly reducing warming.
 - **Mitigation:** Largest benefits are to those in the further future who are avoiding the worst impacts of cumulative emissions.
- A purchase of a cooling credit does not count against obligation to reduce emissions.
- Without strong decarbonization policy, cooling credits risk being used in this way.

Implications of the Separate Responsibilities Objection

- Challenges the underlying normative framework of most Integrated Assessment Models.
 - Usually *one* obligation: Maximizing global welfare
 - Solar geoengineering and mitigation are substitutable means to the same welfare-maximizing end.
- Implications extend to how we think about CDR markets and other offset-based mechanisms.
 - If emissions reductions and CDR are properly conceived of as separate responsibilities, same conclusion will apply.

Thank you

Further feedback and conversation warmly welcome at brittaclark@g.harvard.edu



Link to slides