

- 1 **Trade Law Constraints on BTAs and Carbon Tax Credits**
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- 2 **Three Possible Internationally-Oriented Measures in Connection with a National Carbon Tax**
 - Ⓐ Import BTA
 - Ⓑ Carbon Tax Credit
 - Ⓒ Export BTA
- 3 **Design principles derived from WTO law . . .**
- 4 **Import BTA Analysis**
 - Ⓐ GATT Article II import charge or Article III internal tax?
 - Ⓑ If Article III internal tax,
 - Like products
 - Taxed in excess?
 - Ⓒ Article I MFN
 - Ⓓ Article XX exception
 - XX(b): necessary to protect human life
 - XX(g): related to conservation of exhaustible natural resources and made effective in conjunction with domestic limits
 - Plus chapeau: not arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
- 5 **Is Article II Applicable?**
 - Ⓐ Applies to charges on or in connection with importation
 - Art. II:2(a) exception for “charge equivalent to an internal tax” consistent with Art. III “in respect of the like domestic product”
 - Fact of application at the border not determinative
 - China—Auto Parts: is obligation to pay “triggered” by importation, or by internal factor
 - Factual question—
 - Control by structuring to be triggered by internal factor, such as sale or consumption
 - Would tribunal look through this at PPM (prior to importation) basis for tax?
 - Lore: direct taxes not adjustable
- 6 **Import BTA—GATT Art. II**
 - Ⓐ Structure an import BTA so that it is triggered by an internal factor or action, even if it is enforced at the border.
 - Consider characterizing the domestic tax as a consumption tax—consumption is internal
 - Ⓑ Structure the import BTA as a tax on a product, rather than on the production process
 - Ⓒ Import BTA must be qualitatively and quantitatively equivalent to the domestic carbon tax
- 7 **Import BTA—GATT Art. III**
 - Ⓐ Calibration of carbon tax and import BTA to actual carbon intensity may violate Art. III: PPM like products issue

- ⊙ Setting the carbon tax and import BTA as a product-based tax (e.g., steel), without calibrating for carbon, would not violate Art. III

8 **Import BTA—GATT Art. I MFN**

- ⊙ Calibration of carbon tax and import BTA to actual carbon intensity may violate Art. I
- ⊙ Making the import BTA conditional on the exporting state's carbon regime may violate Art. I
- ⊙ Setting the carbon tax and import BTA as a product-based tax (e.g., steel), without calibrating for carbon, would not violate Art. I
- ⊙

9 **Violations Excepted Under GATT Art. XX**

- ⊙ Possible applicable subsections: XX(b), XX(g)
- ⊙ Must also satisfy "chapeau" (preamble): no arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail

10 **Art. XX(b) Exception?**

- ⊙ Necessity to protect human life
- ⊙ Necessity balancing: importance, contribution, trade restrictiveness
- ⊙ Evidence to suggest import BTA will contribute to public health in US
- ⊙ Least restrictive alternative—make efforts to negotiate a cooperative international arrangement

11 **Art. XX(g) Exception**

- ⊙ Relating to conservation of exhaustible natural resources, made effective in conjunction with domestic restrictions
- ⊙ Climate as natural resource (clean air, turtles precedents)
- ⊙ Evidence that import BTA will conserve stable climate
- ⊙ Make effective in conjunction with domestic carbon tax

12 **Art. XX Chapeau**

- ⊙ Import BTA must treat imports no worse than domestic products
- ⊙ Import BTA must treat imports from different countries equally
- ⊙ But, must be reduced if
 - Exporting country has carbon reduction mechanism, or
 - Low-carbon producer
- ⊙ Prior good faith negotiations required

13 **Art. XX Chapeau, cont'd**

- ⊙ Differences in treatment should not be based on trade exposure
- ⊙ Export BTA—rebating carbon tax on exports—may be inconsistent with defense for import BTA
- ⊙ Domestic carbon tax credit should be reflected in reduced import BTA

14 **Art. XX Chapeau, cont'd**

- ⊙ Recall that a product-based tax targeting specific products, but not carbon content, would not violate Arts. I, II, or III, and so would not need justification under Art. XX
- ⊙ If import BTA set by reference to carbon content,

- May use a reasonable default benchmark
- But must give foreign producers equivalent chance to show lower carbon content
- May need to cooperate with exporting states to audit

15 **UNFCCC/Kyoto/Paris**

- ⊙ Setting the chapeau “line of equilibrium” as to what is arbitrary or unjustifiable
- ⊙ Nairobi Ministerial—MEAs and WTO
- ⊙

16 **Carbon Tax Credits**

- ⊙ Possible substitute for export BTA
- ⊙ If structured for limited Pigouvian application of tax rather than credit, no subsidy—not “tax otherwise due”
 - Or structure as consumption tax
 - Recall that a consumption tax might limit the need for import BTA, because it would apply to domestic consumption of imported goods. Importer as withholding agent.

17 **Carbon Tax Credits, cont’d**

- ⊙ Avoid export contingency
- ⊙ Export targeting is OK
- ⊙ Avoid specificity: use objective, verifiable standards for availability
 - E.g., carbon intensity
 - Avoid allocation based on trade exposure
- ⊙ If not export contingent, and not specific, not actionable
- ⊙

18 **Export BTA**

- ⊙ Recall concerns regarding Art. XX chapeau
- ⊙ Possible exception from definition of “subsidy” if viewed as “borne by a product” (Footnote 1 of SCM)
- ⊙ Excluded from definition of “export subsidy”
- ⊙ If vary by reference to destination, could violate GATT Art. I

19 **Compliance Strategy**

- ⊙ Even if violation, no retaliation until authorized—litigation takes 3+ years
- ⊙ Then, except for export subsidies, retaliation limited to that equivalent to nullification or impairment
- ⊙ Possibility of “efficient breach” or civil disobedience
- ⊙ Can compensate targets of retaliation

20 **Conclusion**

- ⊙ Tax and BTA *on* products that tend to have high carbon content raises no WTO law problem
- ⊙ If differentiate by carbon content, may violate Arts. I or III
- ⊙ Structure as consumption tax reduces WTO risk
- ⊙ Art. XX defense may be available for even-handed domestic tax/import BTA combination

21 **Conclusion, cont’d**

- Carbon tax credits should avoid export contingency; should be allocated based on objective criteria
- Export BTAs can be structured to comply with WTO law, but may make Art. XX exception for import BTAs unavailable
- Existence of FCCC rule authorizing/requiring carbon taxes with BTAs would support Art. XX exception
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